Human Rights and German Intellectual History in Transnational Perspective by Shell, Susan Meld et al.
Human Rights and German Intellectual History
in Transnational Perspective
(edited by Claudia Breger, imke Meyer, Johannes von Moltke, and Carl Niekerk;
with contributions by Susan Meld Shell, robert Deam tobin, Michelle Moyd,
Paul Michael lützeler, hadji Bakara and Jana Schmidt, Samuel Moyn,
and andreas huyssen, and with an “in lieu of an afterword” by Claudia Breger)
human rights, recently, have been a controversial topic. a debate has unfolded that in-
cludes concerns about their political instrumentalization, appropriation, and narrowing,
as well as fundamental critiques about their viability from leftist and right-wing perspec-
tives. on the one hand human rights today are seen as central to domestic and interna-
tional politics; on the other hand their legitimacy is questioned more than ever (see
Benhabib 8–11). this forum seeks to respond to these controversies with a step back onto
scholarly terrain, taking rigorous, historicizing, and focused looks at human rights dis-
courses from a transnationally inflected German Studies angle. Questions of human rights
exceed national frameworks by their very nature, and transnational contexts and exchanges
have been fundamental to their development historically as well as today. at the same
time, human rights discussions have been complexly entangled in nationalist projects, lo-
calized intellectual histories, and political struggles. Discussing human rights is therefore
by necessity multifaceted; “a close examination of human rights” is not possible, “without
a genuine attempt to partake in cultural historical, philosophical, psychological, and soci-
ological deliberations at once” (kaul/kim 5). existing scholarly work on the history of
human rights indicates complex, plural genealogies of relevant conceptualizations. these
are rich traditions that have been charted in terms of continuity (hunt) as well as discon-
tinuity (Moyn), and which open onto a host of contemporary and future issues.
the contributions below first trace the emergence of human rights discourses back to
the european enlightenment, where the debate on human rights was part of a shift from
a religious to a secular foundation of rights, a shift that moved parallel to a turn away from
natural towards positive law. it was the author and philosopher Jean-Jacques rousseau who
was one of the first to use the term “human rights” (“droits de l’homme”) in 1762 (hunt
23–24), after which the term gained currency quickly, with literature functioning as an im-
portant medium of imagining and communicating about such rights (hunt 35–69). Susan
Meld Shell reconstructs the centrality of kant for the German debate about human rights,
retrieving his arguments from beyond their different appropriations in the theories of John
rawls and robert Nozick. as Shell’s contribution also reminds us, reflections on human
rights were always linked to moments of political turmoil and crisis, such as, in the eigh-
teenth century, the american and the French revolutions. But they also always constituted
a positive response to such crises; they were part of a transitional process of moving towards
a new sense of justice, which stretched across the long nineteenth century and extended
from human to civil and sexual rights, as robert tobin’s contribution details.
a second key moment in the history of human rights are the debates during the period
immediately after World War two, the phase of official recognition and institutionalization
of human rights beyond the nation states when human rights became a transnational con-
cept. a transnational figure in his own right, hermann Broch contributed some particularly
perspicacious reflections to these debates from the 1930s to the beginnings of the Cold
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War, as Paul Michael lützeler outlines in his piece. While the immediate occasion for these
debates may have been the atrocities of World War two, the holocaust, and mass depor-
tations, it is also important to see these debates as a culmination point that engaged with
the colonial violence and genocide of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and the
legacy of World War one, and with changed views on the rights of women, minorities, and
colonized peoples. Michelle Moyd tackles this colonial context in her contribution to this
forum, asking how we can apply the concept of human rights to a historical space in which
brutally subjected and murdered african peoples were excluded from it, and in which anti-
colonial assertions of sovereignty used a different language. highlighting discontinuities
in the development and utilization of human rights discourses, Samuel Moyn reminds us
that after World War two, human rights in West Germany were just as likely to be instru-
mentalized for right-wing causes as they were to be critiqued from the political right and
the political left. in a contribution that looks across the atlantic to read adrienne rich’s
powerful poem “North american time” against the backdrop of transnational histories of
modern political violence, hadji Bakara and Jana Schmidt also make a forceful plea for
reading literature as an active contributor to that discourse in its own right.
We live in times of heightened reflection on human rights in German-speaking coun-
tries, the United States, and elsewhere. Without a doubt such a need to rethink human
rights is rooted in a sense of crisis. this crisis may have something to do with the percep-
tion that human rights, as we know them, are no longer doing the work they are supposed
to do. or the need to reflect on human rights may be a symptom that we live in an era of
“transitional justice” (Murphy 50–59, 153–56), in which our understanding of what basic
human rights are needs to be given new substance. in his contribution, andreas huyssen
encourages us to look thus at our contemporary moment—after the postwar era and the
end of the Cold War—as a point at which a sense of crisis converges with the need to re-
think human rights, and to do just that by querying the complex juncture of human rights
and memory politics. Some scholars have spoken of the current era as one of a “new hu-
manitarian sensibility” after the end of the cold war (Ganguly 1, 37). Notions of (universal)
human rights are challenged and face attacks from the political right and left, and yet we
have also learned to think of human rights in new ways: as lGBtQ+ rights; social and
economic rights; as inextricably linked to the rights of immigrants and minorities; and as
involving environmental and animal rights studies perspectives.
our goal is for this forum to contribute a number of possible perspectives to this nec-
essary debate on human rights, in the knowledge that human rights are essential for en-
abling an emancipatory potential for minorities and stateless populations, considering
social and economic rights, and articulating critiques from environmental, affect, and an-
imal studies’ angles. Directly or indirectly, each of the following contributions to this forum
also makes the case for the importance of the humanities, literature and the arts, and mod-
ern media in imagining, expanding and, at times, also criticizing human rights, from the
epistolary novel to social media today.
ß
Kant on Human Rights and the Right of Humanity
although the name and authority of kant are frequently invoked in contemporary human
rights discourse, careful attention to his own treatment of rights is rarer. that this is so is
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not altogether surprising; for as luigi Caranti has recently observed (Caranti), kant’s “Doc-
trine of right” (“rechtslehre”) in his Metaphysik der sitten is among the most subtle and
difficult of his practical philosophic works, posing numerous textual and interpretive ques-
tions over which there is much scholarly disagreement. among the issues raised is the re-
lation between kant’s ethical and juridical theory, and with it, how dependent the latter
theory is on “metaphysical” commitments of various kinds, from the “noumenal” character
of our “humanity,” to the radical autonomy, or independence of our power of choice from
pathological incentives, that kant calls a “fact of pure reason” (kant, vol. 5, 31).
at the same time, ever since John rawls and robert Nozick—each from his own dif-
fering perspective—both described their influential approaches to rights as “kantian,”
kant’s name has been associated with a broad spectrum of postwar liberal thought, from
the social-democratic left to the libertarian right, both in the english-speaking world and
beyond. that both rawls and Nozick can claim a legitimate (if not altogether faithful)
share in kant’s philosophic legacy is itself not insignificant. For if it raises a warning flag
that kant’s texts may simply be too terse or ambiguous to yield a single, authoritative read-
ing, it also suggests, on a more positive note, that his doctrines might have a happy flexi-
bility as to application that belies their reputation for rigidity and doctrinairism.
Given current challenges to liberalism, broadly conceived—which has done so much to
raise the national and international profile of “human rights,” and for which there is cur-
rently no obvious substitute of equal sway—, a closer look, however partial and provisional,
at kant’s own doctrine of rights seems warranted. Where then to begin? kant’s fullest ex-
tended treatment of rights occurs in a work that appeared in the final years of his productive
career, at a time of fraught but easing political tensions in kant’s Prussia, and with a newly
installed monarch more liberal in his policies, especially with regard to academic censorship,
than his immediate predecessor. though long in the planning, the Metaphysik der sitten,
when it finally appeared, was not only the fruit of long meditation, but also of an atmosphere
in which “republican” sentiments could be more openly expressed than previously.
that said, kant’s initial principles and premises are presented with an off-putting “ab-
stractness” that might well deter even the most sympathetic readers. For unlike subscribers
to “natural law” in the traditional sense, or earlier thinkers like hobbes and locke who
rest their “state of nature” in empirical facts about the human condition, kant begins with
a definition of external freedom that applies not just to “human nature,” or to human
beings as we empirically know them, but to all rational beings whose “free arbitrium,” or
power of choice (“Willkür”), over means and ends can limit or be limited by the “Willkür”
of others. and yet the promise of kant’s undertaking—namely, to derive rules of conduct
and mutual obligation that are genuinely universal and objective, in part because they are
seated in the phenomenology, as it were, of free choice itself—counsels patience.
What, then, does kant mean by (free) “Willkür”?  Unlike God or gods, we (along with
other rational beings, if there are any such, whose powers are thus limited) cannot realize our
ends without making use of means, beginning with our own vital powers, whose application
always entails a cost, be it only lost opportunity.  (an hour spent eating cannot be spent sleep-
ing or running.) the means available to us include not only our vital, animal, and rational
powers, but also external objects, including, in the first instance, the ground on which we
stand, and extending to whatever things one might find useful, from the apple that i pluck,
to the partridge i have shot, to the dog (or human being) i might induce to fetch it. What is
crucial, from kant’s perspective, is that such means, if they are to count as an object of choice
(rather than of idle dreaming) must be perceived as genuinely obtainable. an apple utterly
beyond reach is not a true object of choice, though it might be an object of mere wishing.
392 ThE GERMAn QuARTERly Summer 2020
the fundamental principle of “right” [“Das recht”] (as distinguished from “rights” [“die
rechte”]) bears meaningful comparison, as kant sees it, with the principle of action and
reaction (kant, vol. 6, 32). Just as bodies resist penetration by other bodies of their own
space in accordance with the formal laws of physics, so persons rightfully exclude others
from their own sphere of action (by force, if necessary) in accordance with the formal prin-
ciples of justice. three things follow:
First: the fundamental “human right” that all “acquired” rights presuppose cannot be
exercised in isolation. a sole occupant, say, of a small planet, incapable of making use of
means of which other juridical agents also might make use, would have no “rights” in a
meaningful juridical sense (though he/she might still have self-directed ethical duties in
accordance with the “rights of one’s humanity”) (kant, vol. 6, 40).
Second: this initial right to exclude others from the use of one’s immediate powers or
means (“Vermögen”), and concomitant obligation on their part, entails a reciprocal obli-
gation on our part vis-à-vis the means of others.
third: this right is accompanied by an authorization to use coercion, e.g., to physically
exclude others from the non-consensual use of what is rightfully mine. Such resistance may
take the form of merely pushing back (e.g., when a fellow passenger inadvertently falls asleep
on my own shoulder) or, in cases of intentionally wrongful use, compensatory action pro-
portional to the degree of freedom that the offender has thereby forfeited (in accordance
with the principle that one should be treated by the same rule that one applies to others). 
the rightful sphere of action that is more or less coterminous with our own bodily
boundaries and the rational powers they harbor represents the minimum “inner property”
necessary for meaningful juridical agency. and our right to such a sphere of action is ours
“innately,” as kant puts it, just because we are not only human beings (in a natural sense)
but also persons of a special sort: namely invested with the end-setting powers that he
identifies with (or as) our “humanity.” our innate right thus has a double character: en-
tailing both rights that we can forfeit (by violating the rights of others), and a fundamental
right to recognition of our dignity as persons that limits what can rightfully be done to us
in any case and precluding, for example, degrading punishments (such as stripes and tor-
ture) that could offend against humanity itself (kant, vol. 6, 333).
all further rights to the exclusive use of objects (e.g., those from which one is physically
separated), or to the actions of another (who has, say, contracted to perform some service)
presuppose both a primary (potentially forfeitable) right to the use of one’s own bodily
powers, and a primary (nonforfeitable) right to be treated as a person invested with hu-
manity. Such further, “external property” (e.g., to exclusive possession of a piece of land
extending beyond the limits of the ground one stands on) is conditional, however, on as-
surance that one will in turn refrain from encroaching on the rights of others, assurance
one can only provide when all agree, or are otherwise compelled, to enter into what kant
calls a “juridical condition.”
the name for such a juridical condition is “the state”; and its basic purpose (along with
that of “public right” more generally) is twofold: first to provide the mutual assurance necessary
if (acquired) rights are to have what kant calls “actuality” [“Wirklichkeit”], i.e., effectual ex-
istence. absent such a public condition, one can make judgments about matters of acquired
right (or what is “mine” and “yours” externally) but not rightfully enforce them without doing
violence to their own right to do what “seems right and good to them” without depending in
this on “the opinion of another” (kant, vol. 6, 312). and one can defend the rights that one
enjoys innately (e.g., over one’s own natural powers), and by the mere fact of being a human
being, but not rightfully condemn, let alone punish, those who infringe on them.
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this brings us to the second basic function of the state, and the second reason that
without it right remains “unactualized”: namely, to legislate in accordance with a “general
will” (at least “in the idea”) and thereby make it possible to punish offenders without doing
violence, in turn, to our innate independence from being bound in such matters by an-
other’s unilateral opinion.
the complications of kant’s doctrine are too numerous and deep to occupy a brief
essay of this sort. But enough has, i hope, been said to indicate both its potential analytic
power, and its potentially fruitful applications to a variety of pressing contemporary con-
cerns, from international relations (e.g., by rendering a “world court” with powers of en-
forcement doubtful, short of a world government), to domestic politics (e.g., by underlining
the interdependence of individual rights and the political community that can realize these
rights only by partially transcending them).  in short: in contrast to both the economic
libertarianism of Nozick and the welfare state egalitarianism of rawls, a genuinely kantian
politics would acknowledge the requirements and demands of liberal peoplehood: e.g.,
those affective bonds, moral and otherwise, absent which no liberal state, however worthy




The Enlightenment Origins of Sexual Human Rights 
Writing about human rights just as the United Nations was about to issue its “Universal Dec-
laration of human rights” in 1948, hannah arendt observed that, for all the fuss that the
inalienable rights of man caused in the eighteenth century, they quickly receded as a political
topic in the nineteenth century (Origins 291–92). according to Samuel Moyn, just a few po-
litically marginalized groups such as women, Jews, and enslaved peoples continued to draw
on the rhetoric of the rights of man (The last utopia 32). one even more obscure social group
also found the discourse of human rights important in its battles: the nineteenth-century ho-
mosexual emancipation movement in German-speaking europe. From at least the 1830s on,
these men who erotically loved other men wielded the language of “Menschenrechte” to de-
mand rights for people who sexually desired others of their own sex. Sexual freedom was a
significant consequence of the eighteenth-century declarations of the rights of man.
in his two-volume defense of male-male love, Eros. Die Männerliebe der Griechen (1836–
38), heinrich hössli (1784–1864) employs the term “human rights” in the context of an
argument denouncing the idea that anyone would choose male-male attraction, given that
such a choice would mean losing so much, including “all external and internal human rights”
(2: 228). although hössli does not provide a definition of “Menschenrechte,” the other so-
cial losses mentioned hint at his meaning: equal protection under the law, public recognition
and respect, access to religion, and the ability to function “als Mann, als Mensch, als Gatte,
als Bürger” (2: 228).  it’s interesting that the word “Gatte” stands next to “Mann,” “Mensch,”
and “Bürger,” as though spousal rights were in the same category as human and civil rights.
although hössli is describing the rights that men who love women have, he is hoping for
a world in which men who love men would qualify as humans, men, citizens, and spouses.
Several of hössli’s points connect to his era’s understanding of human rights. the hor-
rific execution by “breaking on the wheel” of François Desgouttes in 1817, for the murder
of his beloved Daniel hemmeler, inspired him to write the book. While a man who mur-
dered his lover might seem an unlikely poster child for sexual rights, hössli viewed the
murder as a crime of passion that deserved pity, and he considered the punishment shock-
ingly inhumane. Breaking on the wheel was essentially a modern-day crucifixion, causing
a slow and painful public death after the executioner tied the convicted man to a wheel
and carefully broke the bones of his limbs. as lynn hunt notes (72, 74), such violent,
government-sanctioned physical mistreatment offended the enlightened bourgeois pub-
lic’s sense of the integrity and sanctity of the human body, resulting in bans on cruel pun-
ishments in many enumerations of rights, including the american Bill of rights.
hössli also devotes considerable space to documenting the persecution of witches and
Jews. he had a personal connection to the plight of the witches: anna Göldin, executed
for witchcraft in 1782, had lived in the house in Glarus in which he himself was born. he
writes with incandescent moral outrage about executions for witchcraft in europe at the
height of the enlightenment. he fills his descriptions of the pogroms against the Jews
with an equally moving pathos. hössli’s comparison of men who love men with witches
and Jews is not only a plea for sympathy with oppressed minority groups. it also takes aim
at the failure to separate church and state, which results in government entanglement in
Christian religious debates on Jews, witches, and men who love men. For hössli, sexual
freedom is a subcategory of religious freedom.
karl heinrich Ulrichs (1825–1895), a trained lawyer, writes much more explicitly,
clearly, and vividly than hössli about the rights of what he called “urnings” (in German:
“Urning,” derived from the Greek Goddess Urania), people who are born with the body
of one sex but the soul of another. although most of his examples would today be called
gay men or trans women, he also discusses bisexuals, lesbians, and trans men in his collected
writings, Forschungen über das Räthsel der mannmännlichen liebe, a set of twelve pamphlets
which appeared from the late 1860s to 1880.
in a pamphlet titled Araxes (1870), Ulrichs declares forcefully that “the urning is also a
human being. he therefore has natural human rights [natürliche Menschenrechte]. his
sexual orientation is justified by the power of nature. the legislator has no right to place
himself above nature”  (see tobin 16, 89). Ulrichs insists on the “naturalness” of urning
desire in part to push back against the charge that homosexual sex is a crime against nature.
Positively, this claim also positions urning rights as natural rights, strengthening their claim
to that fundamental status that makes human rights superior and anterior to mere laws.
Moreover, Ulrichs enriches his argument by using civil rights as a companion to human
rights: “the urning is also a citizen of the state. therefore he also has citizens’ rights
[Staatsbürgerrechte].” the distinction goes back to the title of the French Declaration of
the “rights of Man and Citizen,” which alludes to one of arendt’s “perplexities” of human
rights: the fact that they are supposed to be universal, but actually apply only within na-
tional frameworks. Ulrichs has clear prescriptions for how the state should enforce sexual
laws, insisting that it can prohibit only the seduction of minors, violations of the rights of
others (via force, threats, and the abuse of the unconscious), and public indecency. all
other consensual, private sex between adults lies “outside the sphere of law.”
Ulrichs’s correspondent and comrade in arms, karl-Maria kertbeny (1824–1882), was
born with the last name “Benkert” in the habsburg empire, but he changed his last name to
“kertbeny” to demonstrate his allegiance to the hungarian national cause. as part of the 
austro-hungarian Compromise of 1867, the austrian government codified certain rights
(actually developed in 1848) in the Basic law, enshrining the equality of all citizens and enu-
merating specific rights such as freedom of movement, religion, expression, scholarship, and
teaching. after the american Bill of rights and the French Declaration of the rights of
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Man, the austrian articles are the third oldest catalog of rights that still has the force of law.
Perhaps these austrian debates on rights influenced kertbeny’s thoughts on sexual rights.
in any case, kertbeny was the first person in any language to combine the prefix homo
and the root sex in order to describe someone with an innate and immutable sexual desire
for a member of their own sex. While the word “homosexual” quickly developed a medical
connotation, kertbeny employs it politically, in open letters to the Prussian Minister of
Justice published in 1869, calling for the decriminalization of sexual acts between men.
kertbeny begins his argument with the repeated reminder that in 1789 the French rev-
olution “publicized human rights [Menschenrechte] as a basic doctrine.” he is particularly
attuned to the fourth article of the French “Declaration of the rights of Man and Citizen,”
which asserts that “liberty consists in the freedom to do everything which injures no one
else; hence the exercise of the natural rights of each man has no limits except those which
assure to the other members of the society the enjoyment of the same rights.” kertbeny
applies this argument specifically to sexuality, concluding that the modern state “has no
business concerning itself with sexual questions, as long as through these the rights of oth-
ers are not violated.” kertbeny situates his call for homosexual rights squarely in the en-
lightenment tradition of the rights of man, insisting that the classical language of human
rights curtails the power of the state and enhances sexual freedom.
the path from the eighteenth-century rights of man to modern lGBtQ+ rights is clear.
knowledge and awareness of the tradition passed from sources like Friedrich radzuweit’s
Bund für Menschenrechte (human Rights league), which flourished in 1920s Germany and
advocated for homosexual rights in its widely circulated Blätter für Menschenrecht (Paper for
human Rights), to contemporary organizations such as the human rights Campaign, which
began in the United States in 1980 and is now the largest lGBtQ+ rights organization in
the world. While sexual freedom has been a consequence of the eighteenth-century decla-
rations of the rights of man from the beginning, the original interpretations of those rights
are not always intuitive today. hössli emphasizes the integrity of the body and freedom of
religion, for witches as well as Jews. Ulrichs focuses on human rights as natural rights, with
an accompanying set of civil rights that criminalize only sex with minors and others who
cannot grant consent, as well as offenses to public decency. kertbeny roots his claims for
sexual rights in the tradition of the French revolution, specifically calling for a limited gov-
ernment that only curtails rights if the exercise of those rights restricts the rights of others.
these classical rights are important and valuable, but they have a history of primarily ben-
efitting empowered and enfranchised men. While the connection between the eighteenth-
century rights of man and modern lGBtQ+ rights is worth celebrating, it can only serve
as the beginning of a discussion, which must continue to improve and develop on this legacy,




Out of Time: Thinking Human Rights before Human Rights
When is, or was, human rights? this question evokes the paradox of writing about human
rights as history in a colonized space, before “human rights” was a widely used concept.
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human rights discourses had existed since the late eighteenth century. But in the late
nineteenth century, when Germany colonized four territories in africa, such concepts had
little tangible effect on the colonizers’ treatment of african peoples living under their gov-
ernance. For africans and others in the Global South, when is, or was, human rights? and
when colonial domination and military occupation are the foundational governing prin-
ciples, what are human rights? Who identifies them as such, and who acts to protect them?
Between the 1880s and 1918, German colonial officials and military officers were in
fact frequently engaged in genocidal violence and other systematic abuses against african
peoples. half a century before the crimes of the third reich created the conditions for a
new vocabulary of human rights, africans living under German colonial rule had already
exposed, through word and action, the extensive harm German rule had caused african
societies. i focus here on German east africa (today, tanzania) as a site where africans
expressed visions of repair and recovery that presaged later post-1948 human rights dis-
courses. yet african expressions of their desire for sovereignty fell outside of German com-
prehension. this was because colonial officials denied africans’ coeval existence. rather,
they viewed them as outside of humanity, and thus also outside of time.
in German east africa, there was no time for human rights. tanzanians labored in chains,
languished in confinement, and experienced brutal corporal punishments, such as floggings.
the German colonial army (the so-called schutztruppe) waged war against peoples who re-
sisted, killing indiscriminately, seizing people for involuntary labor, destroying homesteads
and villages, and stealing livestock and other goods and supplies. even accounting for mis-
sionaries and others who sometimes intervened to soften some of the worst effects of colonial
violence, colonizers did not prioritize the protection of african lives (Götzen 236). Given
colonialism’s essence, it could hardly have been otherwise (Césaire 42–43).
Centering the perspectives of indigenous african peoples living with, or fighting
against, German colonialism in east africa across its multiple registers of racism, pater-
nalism, expropriation, and violence, provides the temporal grounding that allows us to see
how africans articulated their own visions for a different world. attuned to these asser-
tions of alternate futures, we can read the available historical evidence as a critique of Ger-
man governance and labor extraction methods. We can also use it to critique “human
rights” as a free-floating, timeless signifier (Mutua and anghie 33).
the Maji Maji War, fought in German east africa from 1905 to1907, is a rich historical
example that provides such evidence. a key figure in Maji Maji narratives was kinjikitile,
a man described as a prophet, leader, preacher, or teacher. Claiming to have been possessed
by a powerful river spirit, kinjikitile began attracting crowds who came to witness his ritual
practice at a shrine in Ngarambe. his message of hope and resistance against the Germans
resonated amongst disaffected peasants, who were fed up with the Germans’ labor demands,
widely viewed as illegitimate and harsh. rumors spread that kinjikitile possessed efficacious
medicine that would do wondrous things for those who partook. it promised to 
[…] confer prosperity and health, […] protect them from famine and sickness, and would
especially protect the fields against devastation by wild pigs. it guaranteed a good harvest,
so that in the future people would no more need to perform wage labour for foreigners in
order to obtain accustomed luxuries (cloth, beads, etc.). Finally, […] the medicine would
also give invulnerability, acting in such a way that enemy bullets would fall from their tar-
gets like raindrops from a greased body. it would strengthen women and children for the
flight customary in wartime, with the associated hardships and privations, and protect
them from being seized by the victorious attackers, who were accustomed to take women
and children with them as booty. (Gwassa and iliffe 10)
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kinjikitile distributed the maji (kiswahili: water) to large crowds at Ngarambe, drawing
attention from nervous colonial authorities who ultimately decided to arrest him, along
with several other “magicians” in the area. Nonetheless, reports of kinjikitile’s vision and
medicine spread through the region by word of mouth, and through the work of messen-
gers he appointed. these messengers, called hongo, transported the medicine and kinjik-
itile’s teachings to new recipients far and wide. as the medicine and the message spread
from its origins, it took on local relevance in each new space where people encountered
the maji. the future-oriented, even millenarian time embodied in the maji as healing and
protective medicine conveyed revolutionary potential to right the wrongs of colonialism.
historians have argued for decentering kinjikitile in Maji Maji’s history, pointing to the
widespread presence of maji rituals that predated kinjikitile’s medicine, often administered
by women (Wright 138). Within regional idioms of health and healing, maji also conveyed
narrative content, functioning “as a set of ideas that came to be mobilized within and among
societies in southern tanzania” (Monson 48). kinjikitile was just one of many purveyors of
a wider set of ritual practices and narrative strategies that expressed compelling political and
religious possibilities. outrage against colonial affronts and expressions of sovereignty in the
face of unstoppable German encroachment were among them (Wright 138–39).
Shortly after kinjikitile’s arrest in July 1905, anti-colonial military attacks by Maji Maji
fighters ignited the war, forcing German officials to reckon with the medicine’s millenarian
message. Surprised by what appeared to be coordinated strikes against colonial facilities and
representatives, colonial governor Graf von Götzen brought in military reinforcements from
Germany. once they arrived, the schutztruppe launched a ruthless counterinsurgency. By
1907, the schutztruppe had defeated most armed contingents. a scorched earth campaign
denied succor or sustenance to combatants, laying waste to vast swaths of southern tanzania
(Götzen 247–48). this way of war also ensured terrible suffering for non-combatants, when
famine took hold. Some 300,000 tanzanians died in the war and its aftermath.
Detailed descriptions of counterinsurgency operations against Maji Maji combatants
and noncombatants attest to the extreme violence of the war, and to the schutztruppe’s fix-
ation on placing their opponents outside of coeval time. international law, rules of war, or
any other norms that might have brought consideration of human dignity, if not rights,
did not enter into their frame. Neither the Geneva Convention of 1864 nor hague Con-
vention of 1899 featured in their war diaries or reports. rules of war, such as they were,
did not apply in colonized spaces (hull 131–32). Missionaries and colonial administrators
who might have preferred less violence nonetheless rarely exerted enough influence to
meaningfully challenge “military necessity” in ways that might have better protected Black
lives (hull 123–24). instead, colonial sources demonstrate that officers acted in precisely
the opposite direction. they described their african opponents as “barbarians.” they
stalked unsuspecting africans to their villages and ambushed them. they embraced the
scorched tactics that destroyed african communities and prevented their recovery after
fighting ended. after the war, schutztruppe officers, missionaries, colonial administrators,
and scholars documented the devastation. they imagined ways to transform the colony
into a space where “scientific colonialism” would prevent similar rebellions in the future.
ordinary tanzanians who lived through Maji Maji recalled it as a period of unthinkable
suffering. oral histories collected in the 1960s note with chilling unanimity the
schutztruppe’s depredations against them between 1905 and 1907. these testimonies also
reached into a deeper past of German abuses by the schutztruppe’s african soldiers (askari).
Mzee Mikaeli Mguye, a young family man during Maji Maji, recalled, “when the Germans
came, slavery had gone, but the black man was treated in the same way as the slave had
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been treated.” the Germans arbitrarily “caught” people to work in cotton and coconut
fields, for “little pay, while our children starved for hunger.” For this reason, he explained,
“it was no wonder […] that the blackmen rose against the Germans, though they knew
that the europeans were strong in arms.” he concluded his short interview by contrasting
his life in independent, decolonized tanzania with his life under German rule: “But we
are very happy now that all these hardships are gone. We now live like men with dignity.
Some people say that these are difficult days. these difficulties cannot be compared with
those we saw during our youth” (MMrP 2/68/2/3/15).
as an elderly man in 1968, Mzee Mguye likely knew the language of post-1948 human
rights. as a citizen of newly independent tanzania, perhaps he had heard or read the
words of President Julius Nyerere, whose aspirations to create conditions of human dignity
for all tanzanians infused his speeches. his 1967 arusha Declaration echoed many of the
ideals expressed in the Universal Declaration of human rights. along with projects for
improving tanzanian lives, the arusha Declaration also announced plans for the disastrous
villagization project known as ujamaa. Mzee Mguye noted in his interview that during
German rule, “only the Christian missionaries showed signs of good treatment to the
africans.” Situated in the new decolonial human rights discourse of 1968 tanzania, Mzee
Mguye’s reference back to missionaries as the agents of “good treatment” during Maji Maji
again raises questions of the temporality of human rights.
“human rights,” then, is at best a lens that magnifies conditions of life under colonial-
ism. in Germany, parliamentarians from across the political spectrum debated the rectitude
of the genocidal violence unfolding in German Southwest africa (Namibia) as it was hap-
pening (1904–1907). it was clear that ovaherero and Namaqua in Southwest africa were
being violated in innumerable ways. But the parliamentary debates ignored the moral
question of German soldiers committing genocidal violence. rather, they revealed the ex-
tent to which German men from across the political spectrum denied that ovaherero and
Namaqua peoples even belonged to humanity (Smith 111–16; azoulay 449, 460). Within
this paradigm, african peoples were outside of time, outside of “civilization.” Violence
perpetrated against them by european armies and agents was, by their logic, a tool to
nudge survivors towards civilization (azoulay 364).
When was human rights? each time colonized people asserted or defended sovereignty
in the face of repetitive, sustained assault from German colonial agents and soldiers, they
also articulated a version of human rights that ariella aïsha azoulay describes as “worldly
sovereignty.” She locates worldly sovereignty in “knowledge of the land, assiduously trans-
mitted across generations,” which has the powerful effect of limiting “imperial sover-
eignty—the commanding power of growth for growth’s sake” (azoulay 388–89). these
assertions and defenses included everyday small refusals, mass armed resistance to colonial
demands and encroachments, and many actions in between (Simpson 11, 33). and perhaps
most importantly when considering the temporality of human rights, assertions of sover-
eignty were also about naming inhuman German colonial practices that violated them,
their families, their communities, their lands, their beliefs and cosmologies, their potential.
they sought repair, return, and recovery against German colonizers’ efforts “to make their
dispossession a matter of fact and its origins obscure” (azoulay 449).
to resist this dispossession, tanzanians asserted their humanity on their own terms,
and on their own time. their assertions of sovereignty, as expressed through the maji,
threatened the core of Germany’s colonial ambitions. refusing exclusionary German no-
tions of humanity, and referring back to widespread and longstanding ritual complexes
that prioritized the health of the land and community, they responded to the political ex-
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igencies of 1905 with future-oriented urgency and creativity (Samudzi 30, 32). they did
not require an outside discourse of human rights to move towards recovery of land-based
sovereignty that defied German colonial imperatives and the cruelties infusing them. in
German east africa, european human rights discourses fixed africans in the past, out of
time. african dreams of sovereignty drew on the dynamic past and ties to the land, and at




Hermann Broch und die Menschenrechte
Wie viele Schriftsteller seiner Generation hat Broch sich als zeitkritischer essayist zu
Wort gemeldet und wie wenige seiner kollegen hat er das thema der „human rights“
ins zentrum seiner politischen Überlegungen gerückt. Die menschenrechtlichen refle-
xionen durchziehen von Mitte der 1930er Jahre bis zu seinem tod im Jahr 1951 seine
Stellungnahmen zu einschneidenden historischen ereignissen wie der Verfolgung von
Minoritäten und politischen Gegnern in den Diktaturen, besonders durch das national-
sozialistische Deutschland; wie dem ende des krieges mit der Gründung der Vereinten
nationen (UNo) 1945 und dem bald darauf folgenden kalten krieg.
hier seien drei haupttexte aus diesem Diskussionszusammenhang vorgestellt: erstens
hermann Brochs „Völkerbund-resolution“ von 1936/37 als reflektierte abrechnung mit
den Menschenrechtsverstößen in den totalitären Staaten. zweitens der aufsatz über eine
„international Bill of rights“ von 1945/46, der inspiriert wurde durch die zu diesem zeit-
punkt zu erwartende Formulierung der „Universal Declaration of human rights“. Drittens
der essay „trotzdem: humane Politik“ von 1949: eine antwort auf die Frage, welche rolle
die Menschenrechte im kalten krieg spielen sollten. Dieser letzte aufsatz erschien 1950 in
der neuen Rundschau, die beiden anderen Studien zirkulierten zu ihrer zeit unter einer reihe
von gleichgesinnten oder sympathisierenden autor*innen und Wissenschaftler*innen, wur-
den aber erst zwanzig Jahre nach dem tod des autors allgemein zugänglich.
erstens: im Mittelpunkt der „Völkerbund-resolution“ stehen die themen der verletzten
„Menschenwürde“ und der außer kraft gesetzten „Menschenrechte“. Broch versteht die
Verteidigung des „Menschenrechts“ auf individueller wie kollektiver ebene als „Menschen-
pflicht“ (219). er nennt in der resolution keine einzelne Nation beim Namen, doch un-
terscheidet er klar zwischen demokratischen und totalitären Staaten. als unabhängiger
kritiker greift er die tyrannische politische Praxis linker und rechter Provenienz an. in der
Sowjetunion hatten 1936 die Stalinschen Schauprozesse begonnen, und wenige Monate
zuvor waren in Deutschland hitlers Nürnberger rassengesetze kodifiziert worden. Nach
den Statuten des Völkerbundes wollte dieser eine den Frieden der Welt bewahrende insti-
tution sein. Broch macht klar, dass dieser Friede nur zu sichern sei, wenn der Völkerbund
sich zu einem „gemeinsamen ethos der Welt“ (202) bekenne. Das zentrum dieses ethos
müsse die Verhinderung „jeder Majorisierung und Verknechtung von Menschen“ (202)
ausmachen. toleriere der Völkerbund weiterhin die in den Diktaturen innen- wie außen-
politisch dominierende Praxis der „Verknechtung“, so werde er seiner Friedensfunktion
nicht gerecht. ein Staat, dessen Politik auf Unterwerfung von Bürgern im eigenen land
oder von Nachbarvölkern abziele, verliere jene „Paktfähigkeit“ (199), die die Voraussetzung
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der Mitgliedschaft im Bund sei. Die aufgabe der kriegsverhinderung verlange, dass der
Völkerbund nach Wegen suche, die entrechtung von Menschen, die sich keines Deliktes
schuldig gemacht haben, zu verhindern. Die Präambel der Satzung des Völkerbundes von
1920 spricht davon, den „internationalen Frieden“ auf der Basis von „Gerechtigkeit und
ehre“ zu schützen. Broch verdeutlicht, dass das „gemeinsame ethos der Welt“ eine spezi-
fischere Fundierung benötigt. Statt von „Gerechtigkeit“ spricht er von „Menschenrecht“,
statt von „ehre“ von „Menschenwürde“.  „Menschenwürde“ verweist nach Broch auf eine
dem „Menschen eingeborene ethische absolutheit“ (199), wohingegen der Begriff der
„ehre“ national, kulturell, juristisch, sozial, geschlechtlich wie generationsmäßig relativ ist.
Nur von einem allgemeingültigen „Menschenrecht“ aus, das auf der anerkennung der als
absolut verstandenen Menschenwürde basiere, könne man gegen die rassistisch und ideo-
logisch motivierte entrechtung, Verfolgung, Versklavung und Vernichtung von Minoritäten
und politischen Gegnern vorgehen. in diesem Sinne umschrieb Broch die absicht seiner
resolution damit, dass der Völkerbund „eine Deklaration zum Schutze der allenthalben
vergewaltigten Menschenwürde“ erlassen solle (159). es war in den 1930er Jahren noch
nicht üblich, den unerlässlichen konnex zwischen Menschenrecht und Menschenwürde zu
betonen. heute argumentieren hans Jörg Sandkühler und Jürgen habermas ähnlich.
zweitens: zehn Jahre später ging es erneut um die Deklaration bei einer Friedensor-
ganisation. Broch lebte bereits seit sieben Jahren im amerikanischen exil, als 1945 die
UNo in San Francisco gegründet wurde. Damals wurde anna eleanor roosevelt gebeten,
ein komitee zur Formulierung der „Universal Declaration of human rights“ zu leiten.
Das war im Sinne Brochs, hatte er es doch als fatales Manko des Völkerbunds beklagt,
dass die menschenrechtliche Verankerung fehle. aber Broch war selbstkritisch-skeptisch
gegenüber der eigenen resolution von 1936/37 gewesen, weil er vom Völkerbund nicht
mehr als eine „Deklaration“ erwarten konnte: Dem Bund fehlte wegen der nationalen Sou-
veränität der einzelnen Mitgliedstaaten die strafrechtliche handhabe gegen „legalisiertes
Unrecht“ (200). Sollte sich das in der UNo wiederholen? Das ist das hauptthema in
Brochs Studie über die „international Bill of rights“ von 1945/46. Broch lobt die aner-
kennung von „Menschenfreiheit und Menschenwürde“ als „oberstes Gut“ der neuen „Welt-
organisation“ (243). er erkennt hier einen einfluss der 1940 von roosevelt verkündeten
„Four Freedoms“, den „freedoms of speech and worship“ sowie den „freedoms from want
and fear“. er kommt gleich auf das Problem des „Nichteinmischungsprinzips“ zu sprechen,
das in der UNo gelte: auch hier sei kein „enforcement“ erlaubt, wenn ein Mitgliedsstaat
die „Bestimmungen der ‚Bill of rights‘ nicht einhalten“ wolle (243). Broch hält die „Sou-
veränitätsbedenken“ der einzelstaaten durchaus für „legitim“ und möchte nur „seltene
ausnahmefälle“ (245) anerkennen, in denen der UNo das recht zum eingriff in innere
Belange der Mitgliedsländer zustehe. Nur wenn – wie in den 1930er und 1940er Jahren –
Staaten gegen Menschenrecht und Menschenwürde von einzelnen, von Gruppen oder Na-
tionen verstoßen, müsste es die Möglichkeit geben, bei einem internationalen Gerichtshof,
der der UNo anzugliedern sei, klage gegen die verantwortlichen Politiker zu erheben.
Damit diese Möglichkeit nicht dem Missbrauch ausgesetzt werde, sollte man bei der arbeit
an der „Universal Declaration of human rights“ ein „Gesetz zum Schutz der Menschen-
würde“ vorsehen, das präzisiert, wann der begründete Fall zur klage vorliege. Broch hatte
seit 1939 wiederholt selbst an diesem Gesetz gearbeitet, und in der hier behandelten Studie
wird es in allen einzelheiten diskutiert. Den Mitgliedsländern sei klar zu machen, dass es
nicht nur rechte, sondern auch Pflichten, nicht nur eine vorhandene „Bill of rights“ gebe,
sondern auch eine noch zu schaffende „Bill of Duties“ geben sollte. So schlägt er vor, das
„Gesetz zum Schutz der Menschenwürde“ zum kernstück einer künftigen „Bill of re-
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sponsibilities“ (264) zu machen. Die idee einer Verbindung von „human rights and human
obligations“ wurde zur gleichen zeit vertreten von einem prominenten Menschenrechts-
theoretiker der 1940er Jahre: Jacques Maritain, mit dem Broch bereits 1937 über seine
„Völkerbund-resolution“ korrespondiert hatte. Um einen eindruck von Brochs „Gesetz
zum Schutz der Menschenwürde“ zu vermitteln, sei daraus zitiert:
Wer in Wort oder Schrift oder tätlich oder sonstwie die moralische Gleichheit der Men-
schen (Bürger und Nicht-Bürger) angreift, also den Versuch unternimmt, eine nicht durch
strafgesetzliche, sondern bloß durch biologische oder religiöse oder sonstwie gesinnungs-
mäßige kriterien definierte Gruppe von Personen, sei es kollektiv, sei es individuell ver-
ächtlich zu machen [...] oder sonstwie dem haß der Mitbürger auszusetzen, oder diese
zu solchem haß aufzufordern, der macht sich [...] des Verbrechens gegen die Menschen-
würde schuldig und soll [...] bestraft werden. (262)
Mit diesem „Gesetz zum Schutz der Menschenwürde“ wollte sich Broch gegen das wen-
den, was heute unter „hate speech“ zusammengefasst wird. Seine Forderung gerät aber in
konflikt mit der Garantie der freien Meinungsäußerung im „First amendment“ der U.S.-
Verfassung, ein amendment, das ja wenige Jahre zuvor durch roosevelts „Four Freedoms“
(siehe „Freedom of Speech“) bekräftigt worden war. Nach wie vor gilt „hate speech“ in
den USa nicht zu den anerkannten ausnahmen des „First amendment“. allerdings kann
seit der zweiten hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts der Schutz durch das „First amendment“
fortfallen, wenn es um Verleumdung („libel and slander“) geht. Dazu haben solche „anti-
defamation“-Vorschläge wie die von Broch beigetragen. Brochs Forderung nach einem
internationalen Gericht, das sich mit Vergehen gegen die Menschenrechte beschäftigt,
erwies sich als realitätstüchtig: es existiert seit 2002 in Den haag. Weitsichtigkeit kann
man den Vorschlägen von Broch aus den Jahren 1945/46, die er damals an eleanor roo-
sevelt schickte, nicht absprechen. Die „Universal Declaration of human rights“ vom De-
zember 1948 blieb eine erklärung ohne Möglichkeiten eines „enforcements“. Samantha
Power und Graham allison haben zum 50. Geburtstag dieser Deklaration festgestellt,
dass die dreißig Grundrechtsartikel eine Meisterleistung waren und dass die ergänzung
durch Strafgerichtsverfahren in ihrer logik und zielsetzung lag.
Drittens: Broch diskutierte in seinem Beitrag „trotzdem: humane Politik“ von 1949
aspekte des kalten krieges. Der „anti-totalitarismus der Demokratie“ gebe den West-
mächten die Chance, die Menschenrechte der Sowjetideologie entgegenzusetzen. Broch
wiederholte, dass das Verbot der „Versklavung“ gleichsam das „irdisch absolute“ ausmache,
an dem „die Menschenrechte sich fundieren“ (376). Die amerikanische Unabhängigkeits-
erklärung von Jefferson, die abschaffung der Sklaverei durch lincoln und das Bekenntnis
zu den „Four Freedoms“ von roosevelt könnten die demokratische traditionslinie abgeben
für eine „an den Menschenrechten orientierte Politik“ (377) des Westens. eine solche Po-
litik sei nicht nur angemessen in der auseinandersetzung mit den Diktaturen, sondern
könne auch innenpolitisch die Demokratien bewahren vor dem „Wirtschaftstotalitarismus,
der im kapitalismus versteckt“ sei und gleichsam „stets fascistisch ausbruchsbereit unter
der oberfläche“ schwele (380). zudem schlug er vor, eine internationale humanitätspartei
(386) zu gründen, die sich die aufdeckung von Vergehen gegen die Menschenrechte zum
ziel setze. Die wurde zwar nicht als Partei, aber doch als auf Mitgliedschaft beruhende
organisation ein Jahrzehnt später mit Amnesty International begründet. 
PaUl MiChael lÜtzeler
Washington university, st. louis  
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Adrienne Rich’s Time: Poetry as Human Rights History
Who writes human rights history? the question might seem too obvious to elicit an in-
teresting answer. over the last two decades or so the task has fallen, predictably, to pro-
fessional historians. Before that, insofar as human rights were seen as a historically variable
concept, it was written by institutional insiders, often as a form of commemorating, rather
than historicizing, the term.
in developing the boundaries of human rights history, scholars have turned to institu-
tional and national archives, legal scholarship, individual activists and non-state actors, vi-
sual media and, in some cases, literary texts. the most influential use of literature to do
human rights history is perhaps lynn hunt’s argument that eighteenth-century epistolary
novels induced new forms of emotional response making possible and self-evident claims
for universal rights (39–41, 48). in turn, the vast library of works on literature and human
rights that exists today has generally been content with situating literature as part of a his-
tory written by professional historians, or, in the most important cases, as a generative
force in developing the condition of intelligibility for what human rights are, as in Joseph
Slaughter’s work on the bildungsroman and international law.
yet what remains absent from the field of human rights history, literary or otherwise,
is an interest in the ways in which writers of literature are not only subjects of this history
but also develop forms of human rights history in their work. Could it be that literary
texts, and the particular means by which they narrate, condense, distend, and otherwise
transmit the past, represent their own tradition of human rights history? if these histories
go unrecognized, it is most likely for reasons of professional or disciplinary gatekeeping.
over the last decade, such gatekeeping has intensified, as an emergent orthodoxy in
the field has moved the timeframe for writing legitimate human rights history ever closer
to the present. indeed, shifting the line forward, Samuel Moyn argues, might be the “last
interesting move available in the game of human rights history, at least until the rules are
changed in ways no one currently anticipates” (“the end of human rights history” 308).
Writers of literature tend to ride roughshod over the rules of professional historiography,
revel in anachronism, and use form and language to make events a hundred or five hundred
years ago appear in startling proximity. Consequently, they will probably appear as ma-
rauders in the neatly kept house of hard chronology and tightly synchronic argumentation
built by historians of human rights. yet, given the chance, they might also help “change
the rules” of human rights history by widening the ambit of legitimate historical work,
and by focusing attention more closely on the way history is experienced on a phenome-
nological and subjective level, engendering a belief in and understanding of the variable
concept that is human rights.
to this end, we want here to offer a quick and pointed assessment of the american poet
adrienne rich (1929–2012). rich’s personal and intellectual relationship to twentieth-cen-
tury German history is well-known. Beginning in the late 1970s the poet began revising
her vision of the holocaust and her own Jewishness and connecting them to contemporary
political violence across the postcolonial world and especially in the United States. Depart-
ing from the identity politics of her earlier work, rich’s poetry of the 1980s became in-
creasingly multidirectional, moving fluidly between holocaust memory and what she called
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“the recognition of simultaneous oppressions” in South africa, el Salvador, Guatemala, and
Chile (“Notes towards a Politics of location” 227). through her critical engagement with
Western feminism, rich proposed that ignorance of the activism of women of color was
itself the result of a desire to “stop […] time in its tracks” (“Notes towards a Politics of lo-
cation” 227), which immobilized certain cultural references into universals. rich, in other
words, is inarguably part of the history of human rights and, already, of its questioning. But
does her poetry mark a form of human rights history? it’s rich’s particular way of writing
about and situating herself in relation to the holocaust and early twentieth-century politics,
and of situating these histories in the context of what, over the last decade or so, has come
to be identified as human rights history, that we will briefly consider here.
in her well-known poem “North american time” (1983) rich provides an abbreviated
history of twentieth-century political violence that compels here to accept a newfound
feeling of global responsibility:  
Poet, sister: words – 
whether we like it or not –
stand in a time of their own.
no use protesting i wrote that
before kollontai was exiled
rosa luxembourg, Malcolm,
anna Mae aquash, murdered,
before treblinka, Birkenau,
hiroshima, before Sharpeville,
Biafra, Bangla Desh, Boston,
atlanta, Soweto, Beirut, assam
– those faces, names of places
sheared from the almanac
of North american time (your native land 33)
if this list of places and names seems unremarkable today, it’s because we now have the
ready-to-hand term of human rights, which permits us to follow rich across the chain of
associations. at the time of writing, though, this stanza was exploratory––it was tying to-
gether events that had heretofore lacked a shared substrate and temporality. rich was both
scripting her own continuum of history and giving this history an organizing logic.
yet the logic that threads these events together in the stanza rests on a willful and
strange anachronism. how can the poet, born only in 1929, have issued a warning “before”
alexandra kollontai “was exiled” from russia (in 1908) and before the violations associated
with the names of places she lists? here, the holocaust becomes especially important. For
rich might simply be admitting her lack of knowledge of these places just as she confesses
to having been an american girl in 1943, “ignorantly Jewish” while telegrams announced
the so-called “Final Solution” to the State Department. 
Girl between home and school what is that girl
swinging her plaid linen bookbag what’s an american girl
in wartime her permed friz of hair
her glasses for school and movies
between school and home ignorantly Jewish (Atlas 44)
here, we witness rich discovering the memories that obscured what “eastern War time”
(1989–90) implies she should have known: “this is what our parents were trying to spare
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us” (Atlas 46). Now, from the retrospective vantage of the 1980s, her own failure to protest
human rights violations in the past fuels a reexamination of the holocaust in light of con-
temporary violence, and of contemporary violence in light of the holocaust. the failure
to witness the catastrophe of the 1940s obliges her to “become responsible” for everything
that happened before and after, and especially the actions by postwar american govern-
ments that were justified in the name of the catastrophe. “you have to know these things,”
announces “North american time,” meaning treblinka and Birkenau at just a line break’s
remove from hiroshima, atlanta, and Beirut. however, “to know these things” might mean
knowing them together, in a burst of mutual inflection, or a moment of “weak messianic
power,” in Walter Benjamin’s terms, which itself constitutes one way that history appears
and is made available to a single historical actor in the formation of their consciousness of
human rights, past and present.
From the perspective of the regnant school of human rights history, rich’s poem might
incur criticism for its infraction of historiography––an infraction that needs to be taken
seriously if we are to give rich the benefit of the doubt as doing some form of human
rights history herself. at first glance, rich seems here to be developing a history of con-
tinuity: as if Dachau, hiroshima, Biafra, and Soweto, were all of a piece and deserving of
the same kind of action and sense of responsibility, regardless of their deep structural dif-
ferences. this has the effect of disambiguating distinct events in the past in the service of
a unified moral and political project in the present.
yet, a reading of rich as constructing a coherent and seamless historical “continuity”
would be unfaithful to the poem. the catalogue of historical violence cited above is parat-
actically and loosely conjoined in a way that suggests that it will continue to grow, with
no single event marking a beginning or end point, foreclosing the possibility of either
flawless continuity or total rupture with the past. Moreover, if there is a version of histo-
riography in the poem, it takes the form of a series of déjà-vu moments, a palimpsestic
overlaying of the holocaust with snapshots of migrants, algerians, “the landless,” and
women in Mississippi, tel aviv, and ramallah. rich knows that memory alone cannot be
counted on for moral decisions: 
[…] Memory speaks:
you cannot live on me alone
you cannot live without me
i’m nothing if i’m just a roll of film
stills from a vanished world
fixed lightstreaked mute
left for another generation’s 
restoration and framing i can’t be restored or framed
i can’t be still i’m here
in your mirror pressed leg to leg beside you
intrusive inappropriate bitter flashing (Atlas 43).
Nevertheless, the way that history appears to the individual in moments of political awakening
and durable shifts of preceptive can be precisely “intrusive inappropriate bitter flashing.”
in rich’s poem, disparate historical events are made equally available in the formation of
human rights consciousness in the present of a speaking “i,” an individual positioned in space
and time. yet this comes at the loss of a certain kind of differentiation that historians see as
necessary to understanding what human rights are in the present. rather than seeing the
two ways of using history as opposed, it’s equally valid to understand them as two parallel
forms of historical labor, one no more valid than the other, and both equally illuminating.
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the time of rich’s poetry is anachronistic. this is why the speaker of “North american
time” claims her writing to come “before” alexandra kollontai’s exile and the killings of
rosa luxemburg, Malcolm x, and anna Mae aquash: not only because a young rich
was unaware of history but because the pastness of the past is an effect of words that may
either animate its potential or “pretend […] time does not exist” (“North american time”).
the cost of american innocence is clear to the poetic i: “those faces, names of places /
sheared from the almanac / of North american time” are not simply missing; their absence
is “the context […] never given” and the reason why change is slow to come. the difference
between rich’s “undifferentiated” historicizing of violences past and present and current
human rights history may thus lie in the poet’s refusal to position the speaker at the re-
ceiving end of history. 
haDJi Bakara and JaNa SChMiDt
university of Michigan and Bard College 
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Flaming Letters in the Sky of Europe
at the international Military tribunal at Nuremberg in 1945–46, many invocations of
“human rights” were made by defense attorneys for National Socialist defendants rather
than by allied prosecutors. Many insisted that indictment for acts that were not crimes at
the time of their commission was a violation of some of the most basic human rights. But
surely the most remarkable invocation of the concept came from Dr. kurt kauffmann, the
defense attorney for ernst kaltenbrunner, Schutzstaffel leader and holocaust perpetrator,
who stood accused of crimes against humanity.
kauffmann intervened after French prosecutor François de Menthon, the main
spokesman about the nature of those novel crimes, had expatiated a bit about metaphysics
and religion. kauffmann replied that it made little sense to try one man for the death of
God in europe—and the rise of human rights was part of that story, not an alternative to it:
“the question should impose itself upon every thinking person,” he reflected, “why from the
turn of the nineteenth century until the present such catastrophes of humanity have occurred
[…]. two world wars, with revolutions in their wake, are never an accidental development
but rather a predetermined evolution of the human race founded on some intellectual-reli-
gious error.” this error, in kauffmann’s opinion, was secularism, from which human rights
are inseparable: “Coming from england, rationalism found its way to France and on arrival
there changed its physiognomy. […] No sooner had rationalism become the state religion
of France, when the French revolution burst into flames and wrote the idea of the emanci-
pated human rights with flaming letters into the sky of europe.” kauffmann concluded:
“there will be no more hope for a society which has exchanged the stern cult of Christian
quest of truth for the idolatry of reason. after the sophisms come the revolutions, and behind
the sophist walk the executioners” (Trial of the Major War Criminals, vol. 18, 47–48).
kauffmann was repeatedly cautioned by the court president that he might want to ab-
breviate his world historical speculation in order to do his job of defending his client—who
had already confessed. But it is an astounding soliloquy to find in the usually dry transcript.
and it was more than the somewhat irrelevant tangent on behalf of a perpetrator of genocide,
for this sort of narrative was commonplace in postwar West Germany—much more so than
consciousness of or concern about Jewish victimhood during World War two were.
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For years, as lora Wildenthal has shown, human rights were as apt to be deployed by
right-wingers as anyone else, including the lobby for heimatvertriebene or expellees from
the east. (their 1950 charter started out from “the right to our native land” as “one of the
basic rights of man, granted him by God.”) human rights, canonized by the United Na-
tions, were treated by right-wing and even center-right West Germans as uncomfortably
bound up with the root causes of Germany’s catastrophe—and also the root causes of the
communist scourge in the east that World War two had allowed to penetrate far into the
old heartlands of “the West” (Abendland).
human rights were dangerous, the leading West German historian Gerhard ritter—a
conservative who during the Nazi years had eventually become a member of the Freiburg
resistance—insisted in a 1947 essay on the subject. if they protected the religious sources of
Western civilization in its new struggle against the eastern barbarity of communism, human
rights were defensible. But no one should ever forget that, with their close associations to
the French revolution in modern history, they were also secularist poison, and a stepping
stone to terror. of course, West Germans canonized “human dignity” in the Bavarian con-
stitution of 1946 and the federal Basic law of 1949. But as much conservative discourse in
the era proves, it was for the sake of emphasizing that there were constraints on rights, given
their riskiness, and not only on states. insofar as the purpose of rights was to place limitations
on states, many insisted that it was for the sake of moral community, rather than personal
emancipation. after all, the consequences of the French revolution had proved horrifying,
and the Soviet Union claimed its legacy more than Western states opposed to communism.
ideas like these remind us that there was little public connection yet, for years or even
decades after World War two, between human rights on the one hand and genocide and
the holocaust on the other. those in Germany and elsewhere who made appeals to the
first did not orient themselves towards or much talk about the second; those few who ori-
ented themselves towards and talked about the second only rarely committed themselves
to the promotion of the first.
We could look back and congratulate ourselves for abandoning such a situation, as part
of the moral education and “recivilization” with which holocaust memory in later decades
is said to have been bound up. and to some extent we should. We could look back and
congratulate ourselves for understanding that the main reason to be concerned about
human rights, and to promote them, is the threat of genocide, with the holocaust as its
exemplary instance. But doing so might obscure how much we have inherited from the
very ancestors after World War two who failed to make these equations—and how much
more we have to learn.
Consider two shortcomings that we might worry about, in spite of moral education. the
first goes to continuity with our ancestors, and the second involves a mistake all our own.
those who didn’t consistently center human rights after World War two in West Ger-
many and western democracies in general but did give the holocaust and ethnic and racial
victimhood greatest credence for a long time tended to be Socialist. they avoided the lan-
guage for numerous reasons, chief among them an inherited skepticism for it dating all
the way back to karl Marx’s youthful writings, and the emerging lesson that a language
for anticommunism abroad could easily mean antisocialism at home.
Socialists did not set the political terms for our own time; instead, it has been the Center
right that won in so many countries, and in a global setting. indeed, the fusion between
economic liberalism and social conservatism that West Germans may have pioneered most
clearly after World War two has profoundly defined the politics of many countries since,
and the United States not least. even when it sometimes came to power, the Center left
in the Cold War and even after frequently took lessons from the Center right.
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as a result, the human rights that frequently began as part of an anticommunist language,
as Westerners used it after 1945, survived through the decades after World War two as so-
cialist possibilities were slowly blunted and contained. the victory of the language of human
rights in a newly articulated cosmopolitanism after the 1970s, and especially 1989, which
allowed identification with foreign victims and even intervention abroad, coincided with
the institutionalization of economic neoliberalism. there are no simple answers for why
these correlations obtained. But if we bracket them in order to celebrate moral learning we
do not even try to develop more sophisticated explanations for why things turned out as
they did. and congratulating ourselves for transcending the moral blindness of our right-
wing ancestors obscures how successful they were in making our world.
and the new relationship that, over the decades, we established between human rights
and genocide consciousness was not costless either. arguably, what made the link possible
was not the catastrophic German past stigmatized after 1945 but the present of decolo-
nization that so many Westerners experienced in the 1960s and 1970s. obscuring that it
was Westerners themselves—including Germans in their abortive attempts to mime the
global imperialism of Western powers—who set up a hierarchical world, it has been easy
to think in our time that the global south is the location of intolerable violence.
as, of course, it is. But beyond forgetfulness of colonial rule, concern for postcolonial
genocide that the implication of human rights and genocide consciousness allowed also
justified new violence. the “problem from hell” of genocide abroad led many—including
German moralists and politicians from Jürgen habermas to Joschka Fischer—to justify
military intervention on the borders of europe and beyond. that it was a “solution from
hell” mostly making the world worse, and one moreover premised on a continuing hierar-
chy of power and wealth, is a lesson that has dawned more slowly.
human rights provide a language that remains there for the taking. it can be used—
and is increasingly being used—to denounce colonial-era violence like the German slaugh-
ter of the herero in southwest africa in the first decade of the twentieth century, even if
it occurred to few in the 1940s to conceptualize the holocaust as a human rights violation.
the language can be used, too, to challenge economic neoliberalism and social conser-
vatism alike. But German history teaches that there is no guarantee that human rights




New Challenges for Memory Politics and Human Rights 
at the time of this writing, mass protests against police brutality and the violation of basic
civil rights have poured into the streets world-wide. in the U.S., the rallying cry “Get your
knee off our neck” has been heard and understood on both sides of the color line. yet as
trump advocated deploying the military against U.S. citizens, the greatest danger came
not from the city streets, but from the White house. in the midst of the pandemic and
the collapse of the economy, this crisis laid bare the deeper, enduring state of emergency
of the republic: the hostility of neoliberal ideology to a welfare state adequate to secure
the life and well-being of the populace at large. it is a state of emergency manifest in the
federal government’s failure to organize a national response to the pandemic; the total
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corruption of one of the two american political parties; institutional racism combined
with an ever growing income gap; and the undiminished greed of Wall Street, still thriving
while the country is in economic and medical lockdown. Breitbart and Bannon’s “decon-
struction of the administrative state,” selectively focused on institutions serving the com-
mon wheal, has become a reality under trump. american democracy, its constitution, and
the rule of law are on a breathing machine.
this extended slide into a permanent state of emergency, which resonates globally, re-
quires major shifts in human rights discourse and memory politics. Unlike the immigration
debate in which human rights are front and center, Black lives Matter has not resorted to
the vocabulary of human rights. it is hard to say if this reflects deep-seated american ex-
ceptionalism, or the long-standing gap between promises and reality in human rights dis-
course, its weaknesses and, as some would emphasize, its frequent hypocrisy. Both human
rights and memory politics have indeed faced attacks in recent years from many angles,
right and left of the political spectrum: from David rieff ’s In Praise of Forgetting, an over-
wrought manifesto against collective memory, to Naomi klein’s equation of the human
rights movement with neoliberalism and dictatorship, all the way to Mike Pompeo’s Com-
mission on Unalienable rights, which is the “Make america Great again” version of
human rights (see Pompeo and huckerby / knuckey). With its hostility to international
human rights, it puts religious, not civil freedoms at their core, attempting to reverse seventy
years of rights advances since the 1948 Universal Declaration of human rights.
in Germany, there is no such governmental attempt to roll back rights protection, be-
cause the Alternative für Deutschland (afD) does not govern; but the country’s memory
politics and its presumed role as a champion of Vergangenheitsaufarbeitung are radically
challenged by the rise of the afD, arguably a now predominantly proto-fascist movement.
its leader’s description of the Nazi period as a Vogelschiss in history by comparison with
Germany’s glorious past is only the tip of the iceberg of historical revisionism. But then
revisionism is never only concerned with the past. it was especially the immigration crisis
of 2015 that led to the electoral successes of the afD. historical revisionism is thus um-
bilically linked to a radical rejection of Chancellor Merkel’s decision to open the border
to about a million refugees whose arrival was viewed as a threat to the alleged homogeneity
of the Volk. umvolkung became a term in the fearmongering propaganda of the right. the
success of the afD shows that memory politics in Germany has dealt better with the past
than it deals with the political pressures of the present.
the emergence of nationalist and anti-immigration right-wing movements in europe
and of the white nationalist alt right in the U.S. requires a shift in memory studies from
victims to perpetrators, a shift which had announced itself earlier in literature (Schlink,
Der Vorleser; littell, The Kindly Ones) and in film (oppenheimer, The Act of Killing). Po-
litical scientists have focused on whether liberal democracy confronts authoritarianism,
populism, or fascism. More important than such labels, however, is an analysis of how
memories of interwar fascisms circulate today not just in specific national situations, but
through global connections and on the internet. Frankfurt School theories of fascism
(horkheimer, adorno, löwenthal, Guterman, and Neumann) have proven surprisingly
pertinent for such an analysis. it is not just authoritarianism, but categories such as pro-
jection and condensation, mimesis, racialized conspiracy theories, racketeering, and the
centrality of technical media (radio then, social media today) that point to continuities
transformed in a different historical context. Modifying what adorno once said about na-
tionalism, we can now say about trump et al. that fascism is both obsolete and up to date.
the analysis, however, must go further. Memory studies will explore in detail how fas-
cism is remembered by the alt right and the afD and how these memories shape our pres-
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ent. two elements of this right-wing memory culture on both sides of the atlantic are
noteworthy. First, it is white nationalist at its core, but simultaneously transnational in its
references and memes, inspirations and rhetoric. Second, while embracing the perpetrators
of the past, it also adopts the position of the victims by claiming victimhood for itself—a
victimhood of censorship and political correctness, if not of an assumed deep state and an
invasion of brown and black people across borders.
if racism is the common denominator of those right-wing movements in europe and
the U.S., then the current protest movement and what it says about shifting public opinion
on race offers some hope. Coming as it does in the midst of an economic meltdown, it
promises to shift the focus of human rights toward economic and distributive justice. Sam
Moyn has cogently argued that the exclusive focus on political rights is not enough. his
argument is even more pertinent now than it was two years ago when his book not Enough:
human Rights in an unequal World was published. i have argued elsewhere that memory
politics and human rights discourses, which have developed on separate but parallel tracks
since the 1980s and 1990s, must be joined more robustly in order to supplement and correct
each others’ blind spots. Memories of traumatic pasts often remain firmly embedded in na-
tional constellations, ignoring the increasing transnational connectivities, while universal
human rights activism often ignores the deep histories of local conditions. even if reciprocal
acknowledgment were to correct these flaws, however, it would still not be enough. Moyn
shows that human rights discourse, after first pushing for distributive social rights in the
post-1945 construction of the welfare state, has increasingly sidelined or ignored the issue
of economic rights ever since neoliberalism took hold in the 1980s and 1990s.
today, however, neoliberal rule and its long-standing opposition to the use of state power
for redistributive purposes is radically threatened by the virus and the economic crisis that
came in its wake, both of which require global responses. the current upheaval in the United
States shows how distributive rights must be seen in relation to both deep histories of white
supremacy (memory politics) and the ever-widening income and health gap, which affects
Blacks disproportionately (rights politics). Founded as a social movement in 2013, Black
lives Matter has morphed into something much larger than protest against police brutality.
it has helped deepen the national debate over the legacies of slavery, reflected likewise in
the creation of a museum of slavery, the legacy Museum in Montgomery, alabama; the
current dismantling of monuments to the racist history of the country; and the new york
Times’s 1619 project, which described the arrival of the first slave ship in Virginia in 1619
as a constitutive and foundational moment for U.S. history at large. the visceral legacies of
violence toward black bodies are more than a question of memory, however. they point to
the continuity of the past in the present. Such historical self-consciousness, long blocked
out of american memory culture, inevitably raises the question of reparations.
restitution claims are at the core of Germany’s equally hesitant Aufarbeitung of its
colonial past, long blocked by the preponderance of holocaust memory and sheer historical
amnesia during the Cold War. the constitutive linkage between these two legacies was
noted decades ago by W.e.B. Du Bois, hannah arendt, and aimé Césaire, but has only
penetrated the broader public sphere in recent years. What slavery is to the U.S., colonial-
ism is to europe—a past that is not even past. in Germany, restitution claims from
Namibia concerning human remains and looted cultural artifacts took years to be acted
upon. the controversy over Berlin’s humboldt Forum and the struggle over colonial street
names indicate the extent to which colonial legacies have come to the foreground in public
debate. the German government, however, has steadfastly refused to consider issuing
monetary reparations.
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restitution and distributive justice take on continental dimensions as one considers
european colonial rule at large. their flashpoint is not just the return of looted african
art. it is rather the current wave of migration from africa and other former colonies, caused
by wars, famines, and increasingly by climate change for which the Northern hemisphere
is largely responsible. how does europe gauge its own responsibility for these after-effects
of colonialism and decolonization?
europe repeats injustices of the past, so the argument goes, in the ways it treats migrants
from former colonies in the present. Ultimately, we need to recognize how memories of
fascism and memories of colonialism and slavery are interlinked everywhere and how they
both haunt present-day politics in fundamental ways. there is no historically adequate
German or european identity without recognition of colonialism’s legacies, just as any
american identity that refuses to face the legacies of settler colonialism and slavery is an
exercise in amnesia. there are no facile solutions. as both the U.S. and europe are inching
toward recognizing the need for distributive justice, the struggle to achieve it will be a
long one both nationally and globally. We may be witnessing an emerging paradigm shift
in thinking through social responsibility for past and present injustice at the national,
global, and planetary levels.
aNDreaS hUySSeN
Columbia university  
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In Lieu of an Afterword
“human rights,” Samuel Moyn concludes his contribution to this forum with a mixture of
skepticism and call to progressive action, “provide a language that remains there for the tak-
ing.” the evidence for his constructivist emphasis is not lacking. in Germany, the Alternative
für Deutschland “does,” as andreas huyssen sighs in relief, “not govern” today, but the website
of the party’s federal parliamentary group spells out their own version of contemporary right-
wing human rights deployment, quite similar to the Pompeo commission in the U.S. Under
the heading “Sich um die wirklich Verfolgten kümmern,” the afD human rights working
group announce their commitment to “die universell gültigen Menschenrechte” under the
guidance of a “christlichen Menschenbild und der in europa historisch gewachsenen poli-
tischen toleranz,” before claiming that “Christen gehören zu den weltweit am stärksten ent-
rechteten religiösen Gruppen” and therefore constitute the working group’s particular focus.
the following paragraph insinuates that recent immigration into the country has made it
necessary to fully restore the “achtung der religionsfreiheit, der Meinungs- und Pressefrei-
heit, der Gleichberechtigung von Mann und Frau, das Verbot von kinderehen sowie den
respekt gegenüber den institutionen und repräsentanten des Staates”
(www.afdbundestag.de/arbeitskreise/menschenrechte/). While particularly unabashed in this
case, the privileging of religious rights within an asymmetrical culturalist framework, in
which Christians are to be protected while Muslim immigration threatens human rights, is
not limited to the afD or the current moment of outrageous right-wing postfactualism.
rather, this particular configuration of human rights’ deployment has pervaded mainstream
German and european discourse and legislation throughout the past couple of decades,
prominently so in the controversies over the hijab and the Bavarian crucifix in public schools,
in which blatantly asymmetrical bans of Muslim—but not Christian (“heritage”)—symbols
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have been repeatedly upheld in a perplexing legal dance of situational invocations of the
freedom to and from religion, cultural tradition and protection from any perceived threat to
the (“Western”) constitutional values of human dignity and equality (see Breger; Weber).
Given these realities of political malleability and instrumentalization, do we need to
resign ourselves to the postmodern conclusion that human rights are just another game
of words? or else, would we have to counter, as Seyla Benhabib has done, with a context-
transcending normative claim? against the backdrop of the colonial histories of human
rights (upon which Benhabib herself reflects) as well as their brutal absence in the colonies
(see Michelle Moyd in this forum), Benhabib’s philosophical assertion that “any political
justification for human rights” requires a (non-essentialist) universalism (36, see 55) may
make many of us uncomfortable. But perhaps, there is a path in between, which allows us
to forcefully articulate egalitarian commitments without positing them as an a priori truth,
or for that matter the exclusive property of particular Western cultures. as Bruno latour
has argued in the context of the science studies debates, the constructed nature of our
scholarly and political objects and their lack of any original “givenness” do not equal mere
fictionality or the impossibility of distinguishing solid from unsound constructions. em-
phasizing process, he argues that “matters of concern” (as opposed to simple “fact”) can be
solidified—and endowed with authority—precisely in the processes of collective articula-
tion, controversy, and revision (114). this forum has presented close scholarly readings of
individual historical configurations. its few snapshots may not coalesce into a full diachronic
and synchronic picture of transnational German human rights histories; more work re-
mains to be done for those of us interested in unearthing the complex genealogies of
today’s discursive confrontations. But perhaps the forum’s spirit can provide some method-
ological guidance towards continued work in the field. For latour, the path towards col-
lective authorization is in a careful, multiperspectival and “objectful” (more than objective)
tracing of controversies (133). adapted to the context at hand, the charge might be to
spell out nuanced histories: heterogeneous intersecting traditions, the role of different
media and genres, discontinuities along with continuities, tensions, contradictions, and
the interplay of gestures of exclusion with claims to inclusion.
lynn hunt has detailed the eighteenth-century emergence of human rights frame-
works by way of small shifts in language—for example between different versions of
thomas Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence (15)—and the transatlantic flows that in-
formed the French revolutionary government’s granting of equal rights to Jews and men
without property—but not women—, and their official abolition of slavery (28). however,
hunt’s most important contribution to human rights genealogies is arguably not about
political speech proper, but—as highlighted by hadji Bakara and Jana Schmidt’s contri-
bution to this forum—about the role of literature, in particular the epistolary novel, the
emergence of which coincided with that of human rights. “[t]hanks to the working of
narrative form itself ”—namely the direct presentation of feelings facilitated by the genre—
readers were enabled to empathize across the lines of class, sex, and nation (hunt 38, see
40). Perhaps, theodor Gottlieb von hippel indulged in novel reading before writing Über
die bürgerliche Verbesserung der Weiber (1792), published the same year as Mary Woll-
stonecraft’s A Vindication of the Rights of Woman. hippel’s treatise presents a crucial con-
tribution to political human rights discourse in the late eighteenth-century German
context. Similar to karl heinrich Ulrichs’s nineteenth-century advocacy for queer human
rights detailed by robert Deam tobin in this forum, hippel deploys “Menschenrechte”
as closely entangled with but conceptually distinct from “Bürgerrechte” (194, see 183) as
he launches a forceful critique of the new French constitution for its failure to emancipate
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women: “alle Menschen haben gleiche rechte – alle Franzosen, Männer und Weiber,
sollten frei und Bürger sein” (194).
although both hippel and hunt remain oriented towards enlightenment values of
reason and (ideal) autonomy, their interest in women’s rights under conditions of social
non-autonomy and their arguments for the importance of “private” feelings to the public
sphere (see hippel 195; hunt 34, 59) might also point us in a conceptual direction that,
i would argue, is of particular interest to the ongoing rearticulation of human rights today.
Namely, can we question kant’s insistence on rationality and a concept of agency under-
stood as the power of choice (see Susan Meld Shell in this forum) by rethinking human
rights through the combined challenges of affect studies, actor-network-theory, and animal
rights activism? Debjani Ganguly tackles some of these challenges in her recent This Thing
called the World by asking how contemporary world literature reconfigures the eighteenth
century’s “twin ideas of Sovereignty and Sympathy” towards a different “politics of wit-
nessing in our era” with its orientation at the “distant suffering” transmitted through global
media networks (2–3, 37). left-wing critiques of humanitarianism have insistently called
out the asymmetrical contours of today’s culture of global sympathy: “the dominant
neoliberal”—and neocolonial—narrative that contrasts “powerful international do-gooders”
with “victims” deprived of all agency (26, see 33). But contemporary world novels, Ganguly
argues, disturb such configurations of asymmetrical sympathy. rather than investing in
sovereignty as a promise of “autonomy,” their intermedial aesthetics entwines “the semiotic
and the phenomenological” to unfold complex “affective scripts” with a focus on the sin-
gularity of bodies (32, 34). here, an emphasis on “the radical vulnerability of being human
in our times” (27) joins the more traditional human rights focus on dignity (see Paul
Michael lützeler on hermann Broch in this forum).
in the contemporary German context, i am intrigued, for example, by the Bühne für
Menschenrechte’s activist concept of documentary theater. their productions on migration
as well as the families affected by the NSU (National Socialist Underground) murders
aim to tell of “Menschen” rather than “eigenschaftslose Betroffene” (buehne-fuer-men-
schenrechte.de/konzept/). in the tradition of 1960s documentary theater (with its own
prominent human rights concerns), although with less Brechtian emphasis, the Bühne für
Menschenrechte actors present exclusively the words of their interviewees in a frontal format.
in this way, they deploy the powers of aesthetic immediacy to engage the audience affec-
tively. at the same time, they complicate authenticity presumptions and facilitate imagi-
native role reversals through the mediation of professional acting. there is a strong
insistence here that we do not give up on the potential of empathy (perhaps more in the
sense of “feeling with,” vs. sympathy’s “feeling for”) to forge egalitarian imaginaries, despite
all concerns about empathy’s entanglement in dominant power structures, the limits of its
reach, and its political efficacy. at least virtually, the Bühne’s addition of a NSU production
to their longer-standing refugee repertoire also takes up huyssen’s call to join memory
politics and human rights discourse “more robustly,” intertwining emphases on “transna-
tional connectivities” with “the deep histories of local conditions.”
in re-activating and reconfiguring the complex genealogies of humanistic imaginaries
and human rights, scholars and artists will need to keep asking questions about the limits
of inclusion across specific articulations and the scope of rights required to overcome rather
than perpetuate existing inequalities. Perhaps it is fitting to close this forum with a gesture
of homage to another contemporary German author, ilija trojanow, who has forcefully
defended the importance of human rights against now fashionable denunciations of “Gut-
menschentum” (see “Verbale Umerziehung”). the emphasis on rights, including social and
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economic rights—to food, shelter, and health—, trojanow insists, is crucial not least vis-
à-vis mere liberal humanitarianism, or neoliberal privatizations of charity. otherwise, we
are reintroducing feudal structures, on which he pointedly quotes the eighteenth-century
Swiss educational reformer Johann heinrich Pestalozzi: “Wohltätigkeit ist die ersäufung
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